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I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 26, 2004, the United States Census Bureau reported that 45
million Americans lacked health care insurance in 2003, up by 1.4 million
from 2002 and 5.2 million from 2000.1 The report states that this increase
is "statistically significant."2
A national study by the Center for Studying Health System Change
released around the same time reported that the percentage of Americans
under the age of sixty-five who have employer health insurance dropped
from sixty-seven percent to sixty-three percent between 2001 and 2003. 3
As federal legislators work to close the growing health care gap through
legislation offering alternatives to employer-provided health care
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Southern District of Texas; formerly of Slevin & Hart, PC, Washington, D.C. B.A., 2000,
University of Michigan; J.D., cum laude, 2004, Notre Dame Law School. Comments on
earlier drafts from Arthur O'Reilly and Barry Slevin are gratefully acknowledged.
1. Peter G. Gosselin, More Americans in Poverty and Uninsured, Census Says,
SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.coml/html/
Number of Uninsured Americans Rises,
nationworld/2002017115_poverty27.html;

USCHAMBER.COM WEEKLY (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 31, 2004,
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/weekly/update/040831 .htm.

2. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income Stable, Poverty Up, Numbers of
Americans With and Without Health Insurance Rise, Census Bureau Reports (Aug. 26,
2004), available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/income_
wealth/002484.html (discussing results of CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P60-226, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH
2003 (2004), available at
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p60-226.pdf).
3. BRADLEY C. STRUNK & JAMES D. RESCHOVSKY, TRENDS IN U.S. HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE, 2001-2003 1 (Ctr. for Health Sys. Change, Tracking Report No. 9, 2004),
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/694/694.pdf.
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coverage,4 the states have reentered the health care reform arena armed
with innovative ideas and recent Supreme Court opinions that narrow the
reach of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)5
preemption provisions. In fact, as of June 2005, bills pending in thirty-one
states look to employers for solutions to the pervasive problem of the
uninsured.6 Since its passage in 1974, ERISA has had a profound effect on
state health care law because ERISA section 514 preempts all state laws
that "relate to" employee benefit plans save a few narrow exceptions. One
of these exceptions allows the states to continue to regulate insurance. This
exception, within the "Savings Clause," 8 has allowed the states to have

4. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (creating a prescription drug benefit and additional
health care plan options for Medicare); Harvey S. Rosen, Chairman, Council of Econ.
Advisors, Comments on Health Care at the Conference of the National Association of
Business Economics 9 (Mar. 21, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/nabehealthcare032105.pdf (discussing various government proposals that address current health
care concerns); Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: Expanding Access and
Increasing the Affordability of Health Insurance Through Health Savings Accounts (Aug. 9,
2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040809-14.html
(discussing Medicare bill that "establishes new tax-free savings accounts for individuals and
groups who purchase affordable high-deductible health plans").
5. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29 U.S.C.).
6. The pending bills take three general forms: (1) model using incentives or penalties
to cause employers to bear more of the health care costs of their employees ("employer
inducements"), (2) model conditioning state benefits and contracts on provision of health
care to employees ("conditioning state benefits"), and (3) model including reporting
requirements designed to identify employers in the state failing to bear their fair share of
health care costs ("reporting requirements"). The bills can be broken down into the abovedescribed categories as follows: EMPLOYER INDUCEMENTS: Arizona (HB 2545, SB 1471),
Connecticut (SB 1147), Maryland (HB 1284, SB 790) (passed and vetoed), Massachusetts
(SB 743), Nevada (AB 87, BDR 1110), New Hampshire (HB 633, LSR 423), New Jersey
(A4088), New York (AB 4129), Oregon (SB 764, SB 820), Tennessee (HB 127 & SB 383,
HB 1363 & SB 884), Washington (HB 1702, SB 5637); CONDITIONING STATE BENEFITS:
Connecticut (HB 5976), Georgia (HB 389), Maine (LD 546, SP 172), Mississippi (HB
1682), New Jersey (AB 574, SB 2121), Oklahoma (HB 1353), Tennessee (HB 125, SB
384), Texas (HB 1496, HB 1499, SB 770), Utah (SB 66), Vermont (HB 293, HB 358),
Washington (HB 1527, HB 2220); REPORTING REQUIREMENTS: These bills are so numerous
that I will simply list the states that have proposed them: Alabama, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia. For a similar breakdown of pending state legislation, see HR Policy Ass'n, Policy
Brief, Pressure Building at State Level to Compel Employers to Provide Health Insurance
Coverage (Sept. 28, 2005), http://www.hrpolicy.org/memoranda/2005/05-33_State_
MandatePB.pdf.
7. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)(2000) ("Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person
from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.").
8. Id.
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some regulatory control over employer provided health benefit plans that
are administered through insurance carriers ("insured plans"), while benefit
plans that are funded by the employer ("self-insured plans") are exempt
from almost all state regulation. As the Supreme Court has narrowed the
scope of ERISA preemption in the last ten years by expanding the scope of
the "Savings Clause," the regulatory gap between insured and self-insured
plans has widened. While the contraction of ERISA preemption offers
more opportunities for state regulators to confront the problem of the
growing number of working uninsured through insurance regulation, it also
creates incentives for employers to establish self-insured plans specifically
to avoid state regulation, even when the employer is incapable of providing
sufficient benefits through self-insurance. One particular state initiative
that has the potential to realign the interests of regulators and employers is
a legislative scheme referred to colloquially as "pay-or-play" or "fair
share" legislation, 9 which essentially mandates that all or a particular class
of employers dedicate more resources to providing health care coverage to
their employees. The pay-or-play model allows employers to control how
health care dollars are spent while compelling them to bear their fair share
of the health care costs that uninsured employees ultimately pass along to
the state. To date, only two states, California and Massachusetts, have
successfully enacted a pay-or-play law, but both of those laws were
repealed before they became effective. Similar legislation passed by the
Maryland state legislature was vetoed by the Governor on May 19, 2005,
but the legislature overrode the veto in January 2006.0 Consequently, the
implications of ERISA in the context of this new genre of state health care
reform are as yet untested. However, if the analysis employed by the
Supreme Court in the seminal cases" expanding the "Savings Clause" is
9.

See PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, REVISITING PAY

OR PLAY:

How STATES COULD EXPAND EMPLOYER-BASED COVERAGE WITHIN ERISA

CONSTRAINTS (2002)

[hereinafter BUTLER, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY, available at

http://www.nashp.org/Files/ERISA_payorplay.pdf (discussing and proposing suggestions
for state pay-or-play laws that would withstand ERISA preemption challenges).
10. During the final production stages for this Article, the Maryland Legislature overrode
Governor Ehrlich's veto on January 12, 2006. The Senate voted 30-to-17 and the House voted
88-to-50 in favor of the bill. See John Wagner, MarylandLegislature Overrides Veto on WalMart Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at Al. Labor leaders predict that the success of the
Maryland bill will build momentum in thirty-one other states currently considering similar bills.
See Amy Joyce & Matthew Mosk, Unions Hope Wal-Mart Bill has Momentum, WASH. POST,
Jan. 14, 2006, at D1. Wal-Mart, the only employer in Maryland implicated by the FSHCA, has
indicated that it may challenge the legality of the new law. A Wal-Mart spokeswoman told the
Washington Post that both the Maryland Chamber of Commerce and the United States Chamber
of Commerce have questioned whether the law could survive an ERISA preemption challenge.
Tom Stuckey, Wal-Mart Mulls Legal Challenge to Md.Law, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011301
291 .html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
11. Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003) (holding that "Any
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applied to a general interpretation of what "relate[s] to" an ERISA plan
under section 514(a), there seems to be a significant chance that certain
formulations of the pay-or-play model do not trigger ERISA preemption.
Thus, before delving into the merits of pay-or-play legislation, 12 it makes
sense to determine which of the currently available drafts of the pay-orplay model, if any, are capable of surviving an ERISA preemption
challenge.
The purpose of this Article is to discover the limitations, if any,
ERISA imposes on pay-or-play legislation. Part II provides a general
background to ERISA section 51413 and discusses preemption
jurisprudence from 1974 through 1995. Part III explores the Supreme
Court's 1995 decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.1 4 and the implications of that
decision for the scope of ERISA preemption. Part IV considers three
legislative schemes designed to increase employer provision of health
benefits: (1) a blanket mandate that employers provide health benefits to
their employees;
(2) the basic pay-or-play model employed by the
California Health Insurance Act of 2003 (HIA) and the Maryland Fair
Share Health Care Act of 2005 (FSHCA); and (3) the tax and tax credit
model of pay-or-play employed by the Massachusetts Health Security Act
of 1988 (HSA). The conclusion reached is that (1) even after the Travelers
Insurance decision, ERISA preempts a general state mandate that
employers provide health care benefits for employees, (2) the California
version of pay-or-play15 is also very likely preempted by ERISA because it
mandates specific benefits and plan administration, and (3) the Maryland
Willing Provider" provisions of Kentucky Health Care Reform Act were laws regulating
insurance and saved from ERISA preemption); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536
U.S. 355 (2002) (holding that an HMO plan was not preempted by ERISA); N.Y. State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)
(holding that statutes providing for surcharges on hospital rates did not "relate to" benefit
plans under ERISA and therefore were not preempted).
12. Although there is an abundance of commentary available on the merits of pay-orplay legislation, one study prepared in 2003 for the California HealthCare Foundation on the
potential impact of a tax credit for employers in California is particularly interesting. See
KARL PULZER & JONATHAN GRUBER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF

STATE

TAX

CREDITS

FOR

HEALTH

INSURANCE

COVERAGE

(2003),

available

at

http://www.chcf.org/documents/insurance/TaxCreditsBrief.pdf (concluding that tax credits
do not address all problems related to employee health coverage but are a step in the right
direction).
13. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a):
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this title
and title IV shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and not
exempt under section 4(b) ....
14. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
15. California Health Insurance Act of 2003, 2003 Cal. Stat. 673.
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and Massachusetts versions of pay-or-play appear to avoid ERISA
preemption by circumlocuting any express reference to benefits or plan
administration.
II.

ERISA PREEMPTION: BACKGROUND 1974-1995

A.

A BriefHistory of ERISA and Section 514

In the early 1970s, Congress proposed a federal regulatory scheme to
replace the muddle of state pension plan regulations that failed to stave off
the corruption and mismanagement that led to the collapse of numerous
employer-sponsored pension funds.' 6 In the process of drafting, Congress
expanded this legislation, ERISA, 17 to also preempt state laws relating to
18
any "employee benefit plan," including health and welfare benefit plans.
Congress also dramatically broadened the scope of ERISA preemption by
rewriting a first draft' 9 that "defined the perimeters of preemption in
relation to the areas regulated by the bill ' 20 as a catch-all provision with
enumerated exceptions. Ironically, Senator Javits, who was a principal
author of ERISA, explained the drafting change as an attempt to prevent
litigation over the meaning of the scope of the clause.2' What seems clear
is that the change from preempting only those "subject matters regulated by
[ERISA]" to all subject matters that "relate to" employee benefit plans,
16. The closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in South Bend, Indiana, is generally
regarded as a pivotal event in the history of the movement toward comprehensive federal
regulation of private pension plans. Due to mismanagement and redirection of pension
funds into the sinking company, thousands of Studebaker workers lost most or all of their
pensions. The number of persons affected by the termination attracted attention, since the
plan covered almost 11,000 Studebaker employees. The average age and length of service
of the workers who received only a small percentage of their expected pension benefits
made them a very sympathetic group of victims. The 4,000 or so workers in the age 40-59
group who got only fifteen cents for every expected dollar of vested pension benefits, had an
average age of 52 and an average period of service with the employer just under 23 years.
17. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 & 29 U.S.C.).
18. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000).
19. The prior version of section 514(a) would have preempted state laws only "insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to the fiduciary, reporting, and disclosure
responsibilities of persons acting on behalf of employee benefit plans" or "insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to the subject matters regulated by this Act." H.R. 2, 93d Cong.
(1973), reprintedin I SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUBLIC WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 51 (1976) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

20. Jay Conison, ERISA and the Language of Preemption, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 620
(1994) (quoting 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

supra note 19, at 4770-71 (statement of Sen. Javits)).
21.

120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974), reprinted in III LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note

20, at 4770-71 (1976).
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save insurance, banking, and investment laws, was a conscious decision to
broaden the section's scope. The significant effect of a provision worded
as "all, but" is that it implies preemption should be presumed unless an
exception is established. In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has
rejected this implication on the grounds that federal preemption should
never be presumed.22 The Court has slowly chipped away at the breadth of
ERISA preemption both by narrowing what "relate[s] to" an employee
benefit plan and by expanding the enumerated exceptions in the "Savings
Clause." The major changes, however, have only occurred in the context
of the "Savings Clause" and thus it remains unclear what sort of indirect
regulation outside of the areas enumerated in the "Savings Clause" are still
thought to "relate to" plans and thereby trigger preemption.
The scope of ERISA preemption in the context of health and welfare
plans is particularly significant because, as one commentator points out,
unlike ERISA's expansive regulation of pension plans, it provides
relatively little substantive regulation of health plans.23 The result is that
health plans governed by ERISA can be structured to go largely
' 24
unregulated. I mention structure here because the "Savings Clause
allows the states to exercise some regulatory control over the provision of
benefits and the administration of health plans. However, the following
provision, the "Deemer Clause, 25 makes clear that employee health benefit
funds governed by ERISA are not insurance companies, although they
often serve an insurance function. Thus, a plan that is structured to provide
benefits through an insurance company can, in effect, be regulated
indirectly by state insurance law, whereas a plan that is "self-insured,"
meaning it directly provides participants with benefits, is almost
completely unregulated. The regulatory gap between insured and selfinsured plans was likely not an issue discussed when section 514 was
rewritten in conference committee. "There were apparently few self22. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 654-55 (1995) (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). For a
more general discussion of federal preemption, see Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of
Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767 (1994)).
23. Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good
Loophole Deserves Another, "5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 89, 92 (2005).
24. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A):
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this title shall be construed
to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulated
insurance, banking, or securities.
25. ERISA § 514(b)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B):
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 4(a), which is not exempt
under section 4(b) . . .nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or
investment company ....
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insured plans in the early 1970s. The Health Insurance Association of
America has estimated that only four percent of health benefits were paid
under [self-insured] plans in 1976, in contrast to between thirty-three and
fifty percent in recent years. 26 As the Supreme Court has interpreted the
"Savings Clause" more broadly, allowing for increased indirect regulation
of insured plans, the regulatory gap between insured and self-insured plans
has become substantial. The question today is whether the Supreme
Court's willingness to contract the scope of ERISA preemption in the
context of the "Savings Clause" extends to the general reach of "relate to"
under section 514(a). 27 The regulatory gap between insured and selfinsured health plans is the uncharted legal terrain into which the pay-orplay law boldly ventures. Predicting whether pay-or-play laws are capable
of surviving an ERISA preemption challenge under section 514 requires
answering the above-posed question about the extension of the Supreme
Court's more recent "Savings Clause" jurisprudence. The following
Subparts explore the evolution of Supreme Court ERISA preemption
jurisprudence from the passage of ERISA in 1974 until the seminal
decision in Travelers Insurance in 1995.
B.

Preemption of Health Care Mandate Laws in Hawaii and California

Two of the earliest ERISA preemption cases concerned health plan
regulation under California's Knox-Keene Act of 1975 and the Hawaii
Prepaid Health Plan Act of 1974. The California statute required health
plans to cover certain services and the Hawaii employer mandate defined
required benefits for health plans and dictated terms of employer
contributions to plans. In Hewlett-Packardv. Barnes28 and Standard Oil
Co. of California v. Agsalud,29 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that both laws were preempted by ERISA because they "related to"
and directly affected health benefit plans.3 ° The Supreme Court affirmed
the Agsalud decision in a memorandum opinion3 1 and thereby sanctioned
the Ninth Circuit's ERISA preemption analysis.
In Agsalud, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ERISA
preempted all state law "relating to the administration of [benefit] plans,
particularly with respect to disclosure, reporting, vesting of benefits,

26. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA PREEMPTION
MANUAL FOR STATE HEALTH POLICYMAKERS 18, (2000) (citations omitted), available at
http://www.statecoverage.net/pdf/erisa2000.pdf [hereinafter BUTLER, ERISA PREEMPTION].
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978).
633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980).
Hewlett-Packard,571 F.2d at 505; Agsalud, 633 F.2d at 766.
Agsalud v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
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funding and the conduct of plan managers." 32 The court held that the
Hawaii law, which mandated that employers in the state provide their
employees with a comprehensive prepaid healthcare plan, "directly and
expressly regulate[d] . . . employee benefit plans within the meaning of
ERISA's broad preemption provision. - Congress eventually exempted
from ERISA's preemption clause Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act
(HPHCA) and any post-September 1974 amendments to the HPHCA that
provide for the effective administration of the Act.34 In 1994, Oregon
attempted to acquire a similar exemption for an employer health care
mandate enacted in that state, but no such exemption was granted and the
law was repealed.35 It is important to note that Hawaii's exemption is not
based on the substance of the HPHCA, but on the determination by
Congress that post-September 1974 amendments to the HPHCA related
back to the original Act which pre-dated ERISA and was therefore exempt
from preemption.3 6

32. Agsalud, 633 F.2d at 763.
33. Id. at 766 (citation omitted).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (2000).
See BUTLER, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY, supra note 9, at 4-5:

35.

In 1989, Oregon enacted an employer pay or play program (although sponsors
and the legislative intent clause also referred to it as an employer mandate).
The law imposed a payroll tax on employers who had not provided employee
and dependent coverage. [The tax was equal to 75 percent of the cost of a basic
benefits package (to be defined by the state agency) for employee coverage and
50 percent of this cost for dependent coverage. The law also provided tax
credits for small employers that began to cover their workers.] The fund created
with these tax revenues would be used by the state to buy health coverage for
these employers' uninsured employees and dependents. In contrast to the
Massachusetts law, the Oregon tax applied only to employers not covering their
workers.
In recent years, several states have considered similar legislation but not
enacted these proposals. In 1998, as part of a minimum wage increase, the
Washington legislature considered permitting employers to pay a lower
minimum wage if they financed an acceptable level of health coverage. In
2000, a Tennessee bill declared that "the primary source of health insurance for
employed individuals should be an employer-sponsored health insurance plan,"
and would have imposed a tax on the gross revenue of employers that did not
cover their workers. A legislative proposal discussed in Maryland in 2000
would have created a universal coverage program, financed in part by a payroll
tax but allowing employers to opt out by continuing to cover their employees
with benefits prescribed by state law.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (2000).
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ERISA PreemptionAnalysis: "Relate to," "Refers to," "Connection
with, "and "Tenuous Connection" to ERISA Plans

In the fifteen years following the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Agsalud,
the Supreme Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence elaborated on the
simple prohibition advanced by the Ninth Circuit. In 1983, the Court
decided Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,3 holding that a state law "relates to"
an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
"connection with" or "reference to" such a plan.38 The Shaw analysis,
which dominated federal ERISA preemption jurisprudence for over a
decade, set forth a bifurcated approach to ERISA preemption. First, a state
law "relates to" an ERISA plan if it makes any reference to such a plan.3 9
Second, a state law "relates to" an ERISA plan if the substance of the law
has a connection with such a plan.4" Explaining the statutory phrase
"relates to" as carrying a meaning tantamount to "a connection with" did
little to clarify the meaning of section 514 beyond suggesting that the Court
was adopting an expansive interpretation of that language. The Court in
Shaw did, however, suggest in a footnote that "[s]ome state actions may
affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a
manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the plan.' '4 Shaw has
been cited by subsequent cases primarily to support three propositions:
(1) "relate to," as that phrase is used in ERISA section 514, should be
understood to mean either making reference to or having a connection with;
(2) Congress intended to use the phrase "relate to" in the broadest
sense; and
(3) some connections with ERISA plans may be too tenuous and
remote to trigger preemption under section 514.
In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. 4 2 the Supreme
Court relied upon Shaw to strike down a Georgia law that gave special
treatment to ERISA plans under the state's garnishment procedures. The
37. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
38. Id. at 86 (holding that New York Human Rights Law, N.Y. ExEc LAW §§ 290-301
(1982), which was a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute prohibiting, among other
practices, employment discrimination on the basis of sex, was preempted by ERISA section
513 to the extent that the law required employers to extend sick-leave benefits to employees
unable to work because of pregnancy).

39. Id.at 97.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 100 n.21.
42. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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Court in Mackey held that, despite the fact that the Georgia law singled out
ERISA plans to protect them, seemingly in accordance with the legislative
intent behind ERISA preemption, the law was still preempted by ERISA
section 514 because it made "reference to" ERISA plans explicitly. 3
Justice White, writing for the majority in Mackey, held that "adhering
to .
precedents in this area" required the Court to find that "state laws
which make 'reference to' ERISA plans are laws that 'relate to' those plans
within the meaning of § 514(a). 44 Significantly, and as will be discussed
later in more detail, the Court in Mackey upheld the Georgia garnishment
law as it applied generally to ERISA plans. 45 The Court only struck down
that portion of the law which gave certain preferential exemptions to
ERISA plans. Thus, that portion of the Mackey opinion which held that the
preferential treatment section of the Georgia garnishment law 46 was
preempted by ERISA section 514(a) came to stand for the proposition that
any explicit reference to benefit plans in a state law was grounds for federal
preemption.
Drawing on the interpretation of Shaw in Mackey, the Supreme Court
in 1992 decided District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Board of
Trade,47 holding that a D.C. law requiring employers that offered health

insurance coverage to their employees to provide equivalent coverage to
their employees while receiving workers compensation benefits48 was
preempted under ERISA section 514(a) because it referred to ERISA plans
explicitly. 49 Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that "[s]ection
2(c)(2) of the District's Equity Amendment Act specifically refers to
welfare benefit plans regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone is

preempted."°
43. Id.at 829-30.
44. Id. at 829 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97).
45. Id. at 841.
46. GA. CODE § 18-4-22.1 (1982).
47. 506 U.S. 125 (1992). For Supreme Court decisions employing substantially similar
analysis, see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990); FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-307(a-1)(1) (1992).
49. 506 U.S. at 129 ("We have repeatedly stated that a law 'relate[s] to' a covered
employee benefit plan for purposes of § 514(a) 'if it has a connection with or reference to
such a plan."' (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97)).
50. Id.at 130. There is currently one important exception to the rule that direct
reference to ERISA plans will cause a state law to be preempted. In Kentucky Association
of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 335 (2003), the Supreme Court held that
Kentucky's "any willing provider" law was not preempted by ERISA despite the fact that it
directly referred to ERISA plans because the law dealt directly with insurance companies
and was therefore saved from preemption under ERISA's "savings clause," ERISA §
514(b). The law referred directly to ERISA plans by specifically exempting self-funded
ERISA plans. Id. Although significant, this case is not relevant for the discussion here
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III. TRA VELERS AND BEYOND: THE SUPREME COURT CONTRACTS THE
SCOPE OF ERISA PREEMPTION

In its 1995 Travelers Insurance decision, the Supreme Court narrowed
the reach of ERISA's preemption provisions by limiting the category of
state law impacts on ERISA plans that qualify as "relat[ing] to" ERISA
plans under section 514.51 The Court explicitly diverged from its prior
preemption jurisprudence, writing, "we have to recognize that our prior
attempt to construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give us much help
drawing the line here."52 Some commentators have suggested that the most
important aspect of Travelers Insurance is the Court's recognition of the
ineffectiveness of prior ERISA preemption analysis.53 Because of this
express divergence from precedent, all ERISA preemption analysis, not just
"Savings Clause" analysis, should be viewed through the lens of the
Travelers Insurance decision.
Travelers Insurance held that ERISA did not preempt a state law
imposing surcharges on certain insurers' hospital bills because the state law
was not directed specifically at health plans but rather was a law of general
application within one of the states' traditional areas of authority (hospital
rate setting).54 In analyzing ERISA's preemption provisions, the Court
observed that, taken literally, the words "relate to" have no logical
limitation. The court determined that despite the breadth of the preemption
provisions, federal preemption is disfavored and should be construed only

because it only applies to laws directed at the insurance industry. For more discussion on
Kentucky's "any willing provider" law and the Kentucky Assoc. of Health Plans case, see
PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, KENTUCKY'S "ANY
WILLING PROVIDER" LAW AND ERISA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

FOR STATE HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION (2003), availableat http://www.nashp.org/
files/GNL5 1_ERISA.pdf [hereinafter "ANY WILLING PROVIDER"].
51. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995).
52. Id. at 655.
53. The Court here may have been addressing the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
remark in the preceding determination that ERISA section 514 was "a veritable Sargasso
Sea of obfuscation." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd
sub nom. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645 (1995). See BUTLER, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY, supra note 9, at 3; BUTLER,
ERISA PREEMPTION, supra note 26; James Saya, Note, Removing a Roadblock to Reforming
Health Care: New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Company, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 127, 157 (1996); Rebecca S. Fellman-Caldwell,
Note, New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co.: The Supreme Court Clarifies ERISA Preemption,45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1309, 1328-29
(1996).
54. The New York law required commercial insurers to pay a surcharge on hospital
bills, but exempted BlueCross/BlueShield plans from paying this extra cost because of their
higher risk case load as the state's insurer of last resort. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 649.
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as broadly as appropriate to effect congressional intent.55 In the case of
ERISA section 514(a), the Court determined that Congress intended to
subject employee benefit plans to a uniform body of benefit laws and
minimize the administrative and financial burdens of complying with
conflicting state and local requirements.56
Even though the Court
concluded that the surcharges might have an indirect economic effect on
plan choices, it determined they would not compel plan administrators to
structure benefits in any particular way or limit a plan's ability to have

uniform benefits packages or uniform administrative practices across state
boundaries.57 The Court explicitly acknowledged state authority to regulate
health care,58 noted that the fact that hospital and other health care costs

vary across states does not create an ERISA problem, and asserted that
Congress could not have intended to preempt the many types of state health
care regulations, such as quality standards or workplace regulations, that
indirectly impose costs on ERISA health plans.5 9 In conclusion, Justice
Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a law of general

applicability, which necessarily has indirect economic influence over an
60

ERISA plan, "does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice"
and is thus not a regulation of ERISA plans themselves and therefore not
preempted. The Court clarified that it was not holding that only direct
regulation of ERISA plans,6 ' which I can only assume means direct
reference to some facet of ERISA plans, are preempted. The Court wrote,

55. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 19, and accompanying text.
56. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 656.
57. Id.at 656-62.
58. Id.at 655.
59. Id.at 647.
60. Id.at 659-60:
An indirect economic influence, however, does not bind plan administrators to
any particular choice and thus function as a regulation of an ERISA plan itself;
commercial insurers and HMO's may still offer more attractive packages than
the Blues. Nor does the indirect influence of the surcharges preclude uniform
administrative practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package
if a plan wishes to provide one. It simply bears on the costs of benefits and the
relative costs of competing insurance to provide them. It is an influence that
can affect a plan's shopping decisions, but it does not affect the fact that any
plan will shop for the best deal it can get, surcharges or no surcharges.
61. Id.at 668 (citations omitted):
That said, we do not hold today that ERISA pre-empts only direct regulation of
ERISA plans, nor could we do that with fidelity to the views expressed in our
prior opinions on the matter. We acknowledge that a state law might produce
such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force
an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively
restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law might indeed be preempted under § 514.
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"[i]t is possible that a state law might produce such acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers" so as to be
preempted. 62 This bit of dicta makes clear that state regulation that
indirectly effects ERISA plans might still be preempted if the effect on
plans undermines the purpose of ERISA preemption.
To summarize, the Court in Travelers Insurance made several
significant points about ERISA preemption:
*

A finding of preemption is disfavored.63

*

The Court will work with the assumption that Congress64 did
not intend to preempt traditional areas of state regulation.

*
"

*

65
Preemption claims "turn on Congress's intent.,

Indirect economic influence on the choices made by ERISA
plan administrators is not alone a "connection with" ERISA
plans sufficient to trigger preemption.66
A state law with indirect economic effects on ERISA plans
might be preempted if those effects are so acute as to dictate
plan administration and/or coverage.67

62. Id.
63. Id. at 654-55 ("[W]e have never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state
regulation, but instead have addressed claims of pre-emption with the starting presumption
that Congress does not intend to supplant state law." (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981))).
64. Id.at 655 (citations omitted):
Indeed, in cases like this one, where federal law is said to bar state action in
fields of traditional state regulation, we have worked on the "assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
65. According to the Court in Travelers Ins., congressional intent behind ERISA was:
"to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden
of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the
Federal Government . . . , [and to prevent] the potential for conflict in

substantive law.., requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the
peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction."
Id.at 656-57 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand v. McGlendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)).
66. See discussion supra Part II.C.
67. Id.
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The Travelers Insurance decision has been treated by commentators
as a prime example of the current Supreme Court's interest in realigning
the federal balance more on the side of the states. 68 According to the
Pension and Benefits Reporter, the Travelers Insurance decision amounts
to "an open invitation for states to become creative in using different kinds
of assessments to pay for health care." 69
The flow chart on the following page is an attempt to illustrate a
current framework for ERISA preemption analysis after the Travelers
Insurance decision.
IV. STATE MODELS DESIGNED TO CLOSE THE REGULATORY GAP
BETWEEN INSURED AND SELF-INSURED PLANS AND TO COMPEL
EMPLOYERS TO PAY THEIR "FAIR SHARE" OF HEALTH CARE COSTS

State health policymakers describe the pay-or-play model generally as
a method to "reduce the number of uninsured people while distributing the
costs of health care coverage more equitably," through the imposition of "a
tax on all [or certain] employers that is used to fund coverage under a
public program while allowing a credit for employee health coverage
costs. ' 70 While this generally describes all pay-or-play laws, the states that
are experimenting with pay-or-play have formulated two different versions
of this tax. First, California and Maryland have devised legislative
schemes that condition imposition of the tax on employer health care
expenditure. The tax in that model functions almost like a fine for
inadequate provision of employee health care. The other version of pay-orplay is the tax and tax credit scheme devised by the Massachusetts state
legislature in the late 1980s. In this instance, the tax is truly generally
applicable and designed to fund public provision of health care to the
uninsured. The tax credit functions like a subsidy for employer-sponsored
health care. Although all three laws have differing features and structures,
all three essentially seek to encourage or even compel employers to provide
some health care coverage to the thirty-eight percent of working Americans
who are currently uninsured.7 Before evaluating the various formulations
of the pay-or-play law that were designed specifically to avoid ERISA
preemption, it makes sense to explore whether the scope of ERISA
preemption after Travelers Insurance even reaches a general state mandate

68. See, e.g., Fellman-Caldwell, supra note 53, at 1309.
69. Experts Divided over Impact of U.S. Supreme Court ERISA Decision, 22 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 1348 (June 5, 1995).
70. BUTLER, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY, supra note 9, at 1.
71. Kaiser Family Found. & Health Research & Educ. Trust, Employer Health Benefits:
2003 Annual Survey, http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/Kaiser-Family-Foundation-2003Employer-Health-Benefits-Survey-Full-Report.pdf.
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Does the state law refer to ERISA plans (imposing obligations on them or treating them
differently)?
See Distict of Columbia v.The Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125(1992), Mackey v.
Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 823 (1988).

Doe s the state law have a direct connection with ERISA plans (regulating
the: same areas as ERISA or mandating benefits, structure,
hadmr
onistration)?
SeeShaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983); Standard Oil v.Agsalud, 633 F.2d
760(9th Cir.1980)

i

II
Preempted 1

Does the state law regulate

J

insurance? (Directed at the

insurance industry AMD
spreads risk OR involves the
insurer/insured relationship) i.e., does it trigger the "savings
clause"?
See Kentucky Ass'n of Health
Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329
(2003); New York State
Confeenc of BlueCrs & Blue
Shield Plans v. Traveler Ins. Co.,

514 U.S. 645 (1995).

Y.......,

,

Does the state law have an indirect connection with
ERISA plans?
SeeKentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329
(2003), New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).

is
Is that connection substantial enough
Sto have a significant economic impact
Ion ERISA plan administration and/or

IPrTenuous
Not

coverage or is the connection merely
tenuous and remote?
See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v.
Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); New Ymk
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers ia. Co., 514
U.S. 645 (1995).
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that employers provide unspecified health care coverage to all employees.
A.

A General Mandate that Employers Provide Health Benefits

The case could be made that interpretation of the ERISA preemption
clause in light of the Travelers Insurance opinion indicates potentially
different treatment of a blanket state mandate that employers provide health
benefits to employees. Consider that there are four relevant references to
"mandates" in Travelers Insurance and all express the opinion that state
mandates are preempted by ERISA, but all four references qualify the term
"mandate" with some specific scheme of benefits or plan administration.72
Similarly, in the only Supreme Court case citing the Agsalud opinion,73 the
HCHPA is referenced by both the majority and dissent as an impermissible
state mandate of particular benefits and plan administration that would
subject a plan to divergent regulation in different states. 74 Significantly, the

72. "Thus, ERISA pre-empts state laws that mandate employee benefit structures or
their administration as well as those that provide alternative enforcement mechanisms."
Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 648, "... by imposing reporting and disclosure mandates." Id. at
651.
These mandates affecting coverage could have been honored only by varying
the subjects of a plan's benefits whenever New York law might have applied, or
by requiring every plan to provide all beneficiaries with a benefit demanded by
New York law if New York law could have been said to require it for any one
beneficiary.
Id. at 657. "Although even in the absence of mandated coverage there might be a point at
which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson's choice would be treated as
imposing a substantive mandate..." Id. at 664.
73. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987) (upholding a Maine
statute requiring employers to provide employees with a one-time severance payment when
a plant closes, on the grounds that this benefit was not a benefit plan under the meaning in
ERISA).
74. Id.at 12-13:
The Hawaii law was struck down, for it posed two types of problems. First, the
employer in that case already had in place a health care plan governed by
ERISA, which did not comply in all respects with the Hawaii Act. If the
employer sought to achieve administrative efficiencies by integrating the
Hawaii plan into its existing plan, different components of its single plan would
be subject to different requirements. If it established a separate plan to
administer the program directed by Hawaii, it would lose the benefits of
maintaining a single administrative scheme. Second, if Hawaii could demand
the operation of a particular benefit plan, so could other States, which would
require that the employer coordinate perhaps dozens of programs. Agsalud thus
illustrates that whether a State requires an existing plan to pay certain benefits,
or whether it requires the establishment of a separate plan where none existed
before, the problem is the same. Faced with the difficulty or impossibility of
structuring administrative practices according to a set of uniform guidelines, an
employer may decide to reduce benefits or simply not to pay them at all.
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Travelers Insurance opinion distinguishes "indirect economic effect[s]" on
the grounds that such effects or influence do "not bind plan administrators
to any particular choice" or "preclude uniform administrative practice or
the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package."7 5 These cases
suggest that the Court has identified the removal of plan administrative
independence and lack of uniform regulation across state lines as the
primary evils resulting from state mandates that ERISA sought to
eliminate. Thus, neither Travelers Insurance nor Fort Halifax (discussing
Agsalud) directly address the issue of a general state mandate that
employers provide health benefits to their employees.
Furthermore, and significantly, the Mackey decision, which relies
upon the Court's expansive reading of ERISA section 514(a) in Shaw,
upheld a Georgia law of general applicability even though it would directly
effect benefit plans in its enforcement.7 6 The Georgia garnishment law
allowed judgments to be enforced by garnishing plan benefits to satisfy a
money judgment against a beneficiary.77 The Court in Mackey explained:
It is not incongruous to find that Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-20, which
provides for garnishment of ERISA welfare benefit plans,
escapes pre-emption under ERISA, while striking down § 18-422.1-an exception to the general state-law provision-as preempted. While we believe that state-law garnishment procedures
are not pre-empted by § 514(a), we also conclude that any state
law which singles out ERISA plans, by express reference, for
special treatment is pre-empted. It is this "singling out" that preempts the Georgia antigarnishment exception.'
However, while the Supreme Court's decision in Travelers Insurance
seems to affect at least some state laws that indirectly affect employersponsored health coverage, it seems very likely that ERISA still prohibits
state attempts to mandate that employers offer health insurance and other
state laws directed explicitly at employer-sponsored health plans.79
Travelers Insurance seems to have left intact the strict analysis for state
laws making "reference to" ERISA plans set forth in Shaw and Greater
Washington Board of Trade. Justice Thomas made it clear in Greater
Washington Board of Trade that simple reference in a state law to ERISA
plans would subject that law to preemption.8 0 The Travelers Insurance
decision cited this very proposition when explaining the breadth of the
75. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 659.
76. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv. Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988).
77. Id. at 827-28.
78. Id. at 838 n.12 (citation omitted).
79. This is also the conclusion of the National Academy for State Health Policy. See
BUTLER, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY, supra note 9; BUTLER, ERISA PREEMPTION, supra note
26.
80. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 129 (1992).
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phrase "relates to" in the preemption clause.81 Although a general mandate
that employers provide health benefits does not expressly address ERISA
plans, the argument can easily be made that the mandatory provision of
benefits is tantamount to (1) requiring the creation of ERISA plans and (2)
mandating the maintenance of ERISA plans. In fact, execution of a state
mandate could have no alternative result, nor could it have an alternative
purpose. There is no reason to assume that the Supreme Court would not
interpret an employer mandate as it is naturally interpreted and conclude
that such a mandate is purposeful interference with ERISA plans. Thus,
the direct effect on ERISA plans that is necessarily a part of a general
mandate and the Supreme Court's stated disdain for state "mandates" make
it unlikely that a state law compelling employers to provide health care
benefits, however general, would avoid preemption.
B.

The Pay-or-PlayModel
1.

The California Employer Pay-or-Play Act of 2003

California's Health Insurance Act of 2003,8" mandated that medium
employers (those with twenty to 199 employees in California) and large
employers (those with 200 or more employees in California) either offer a
minimum level of health care coverage to their employees or pay a "fee" to
the state to fund a state-run health insurance program, designated the State
Health Purchasing Program. The "minimum level of health coverage"
included mandates on who should qualify as an eligible enrollee 3 and what
type of coverage should be provided. The Act calculated the "fee" due to
the state insurance program according to the number of uninsured
employees an employer employed who would have been eligible 4 for
8
coverage if that employer was in compliance with the terms of the Act.
There are several glaring preemption problems with the California
law. First of all, the law is designed to make the "fee" an overt penalty for
non-compliance with the other terms of the law. The simple use of the
term "fee" and the punitive structure of the law are likely to prevent
successful analogy to laws having only an indirect effect on ERISA plans.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that the penalty is
calculated directly based on the number of uninsured employees in an
81. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S at 655-56.
82. 2003 Cal. Stat. 673; California Senate Bill 2.
83. The Act mandated that employers with more than 200 employees in the state extend
coverage to employees' dependents and provided a specific definition for the term
"dependent." Id.
84. For specific requirements for exemption from the California Act's "fee," see Sarah
Heck Griffin & Brian T. Holmen, California Senate Bill 2 (Mar. 2004),
http://www 1.jonesday.com/pubs/detail.asp?language=English&pubid= 1153.
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employer's payroll.
Second, the California law makes direct reference to ERISA plans by
discussing the minimum level of coverage due to avoid the fee. Although
Travelers Insurance made significant changes to the Supreme Court's
preemption analysis in the context of a law with a "connection with"
ERISA plans, the decision seems to have left intact the strict analysis for
state laws making "reference to" ERISA plans set forth in Shaw and
Greater Washington Board of Trade. Recall that in the later case, the
Court held that direct reference to ERISA plans was enough to trigger
preemption. 8' There is no case law available to suggest that the California
law would not have suffered the same fate.

6

Finally, because the law prescribes specific benefits and administrative choices for plans to avoid the fee, it not only directly implicates the
stated purpose of the ERISA preemption provisions, it also runs the risk of
triggering the "acute ... economic effects" exception to the indirect effects
analysis set forth in the Travelers Insurance decision.8 7 The Court stated in
Travelers Insurance that the basic thrust of the preemption clause was to:
"minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying
with conflicting directives among States or between States and
the Federal Government... , [and to prevent] the potential for
conflict in substantive law. . . requiring the tailoring of plans and

employer conduct
to the peculiarities of the law of each
8
jurisdiction.
The California law presents that very risk by trying to strong arm plan
sponsors into providing certain benefits that might not be mandated in
some other state where the employer also does business. Furthermore, the
scheme of "minimum benefits" mandated in order to avoid the fee is
dangerously like the coercive methods discussed in Travelers Insurance, in
which the Court wrote:
85. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
86. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 656 (citation omitted):
In Shaw, we explained that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee benefit plan, in the
normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan." The latter alternative, at least, can be ruled out. The surcharges are
imposed upon patients and HMO's, regardless of whether the commercial
coverage or membership, respectively, is ultimately secured by an ERISA plan,
private purchase, or otherwise, with the consequence that the surcharge statutes
cannot be said to make "reference to" ERISA plans in any manner.
87. Id at 668 ("We acknowledge that a state law might produce such acute, albeit
indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a
certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that
such a state law might indeed be pre-empted under § 514.").
88. Id. at 656-57 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142
(1990)).
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We acknowledge that a state law might produce such acute, albeit
indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an
ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or
effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law
might indeed be pre-empted under § 514.
The result of the California law by both intent and likely by economic
effect would have been precisely to "force" plans to "adopt a certain

scheme of substantive coverage."

Thus, because of its punitive structure,

its direct reference to health benefit plans and its mandate of minimum
coverage, the California pay-or-play law would have likely triggered
ERISA section 514 and been preempted. 90
2.

The Maryland Fair Share Health Care Act of 2005

The Maryland FSHCA, as it is currently drafted, 9' compels an
employer with 10,000 or more employees in the state that fails to spend at
least eight percent of payroll on "health insurance costs," to pay the
difference between what it does spend and the eight percent to the state

Secretary of Labor to establish a state program for the working uninsured. 92
The Maryland FSHCA is different from the Massachusetts Health

Security Act (HSA) in a few important respects. First, the FSHCA
conditions the imposition of the payroll tax on providing health care
benefits to employees. However the employer chooses to spend the eight
percent, the result is a health benefit plan covered by ERISA. If the law
was read to mandate the creation and/or maintenance of employee benefit

plans, it might be preempted as a law that "mandate[s] employee benefit
structures or their administration." 93 It seems unlikely that the FSHCA

89. Id. at 668.
90. For more commentary on the California Health Insurance Act of 2003, see supra
note 50; Mark Hollmer, Revival of 'Pay-or-Play'Health Bill Expected, BOSTON Bus. J.,
Nov. 12, 2004; Tom Abate & Victoria Colliver, Health Insurance Bill Revives National
Debate, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 3, 2003.

91. LR 1927 was passed by the Maryland state legislature on April 5, 2005. Governor
Robert Ehrlich vetoed the bill on May 20, 2005. However, the veto was overridden on
January 12, 2006. See supra note 10.
92. Unofficial copy of LR 1927 (FSHCA) § 8.5-104(B):
An employer that is not organized as a nonprofit organization and does not
spend up to 8% of the total wages paid to employees in the State on health
insurance costs shall pay to the Secretary an amount equal to the difference
between what the employer spends for health insurance costs and an amount
equal to 8% of the total wages paid to employees in the State.
§ 8.5-101:
This title applies to an employer with 10,000 or more employees in the State.
93. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. at 646.
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would avoid ERISA preemption if it merely mandated that employers
dedicate eight percent of payroll to employee health care coverage. What
saves the FSHCA is the fact that it gives employers a choice between
paying a state tax or dedicating the same funds to health care costs.
That "choice" between dedicating eight percent to health care costs or
paying the difference to the state as a tax makes the FSHCA more
analogous to a law having only a genuinely indirect effect on ERISA plans
(like the hospital surcharges in Travelers Insurance) than the California
law. If the indirect effect argument is accepted, it would be difficult to
contend that the eight percent created an acute economic burden on ERISA
plans when the employer sponsors can opt to pay the money as a tax to the
state.
The strongest argument on behalf of the FSHCA is the fact that it
refrains from any discussion of benefits or plan administration. Thus,
whatever influence the Act might have on the percentage of payroll
dedicated to health care benefits, it has no influence whatsoever over the
structure of plans, the benefits offered, the eligibility of employees, and
choices regarding providers.
C.

The Tax and Tax Credit Model: The MassachusettsHealth Security
Act of 1988

In 1988, the Massachusetts legislature enacted the Health Security Act
(HAS), which would have required employers with more than five
employees to pay a payroll tax to finance a public health coverage program
while providing a credit for the costs of any employee health benefits the
employer actually funded (up to the tax liability).94 The law did not refer to
ERISA plans but only to employers; did not prefer whether employers
94. Massachusetts Health Security Act, STAT. 1988. CHAPTER 23, MASSACHUSETTS
LABOR AND INDUSTRIES CODE 151A section 14G (repealed):

subsection (b)
Each employer, except those employers who employ five or fewer employees,.
. shall pay, in the same manner and at the same times as the director prescribes
for the contribution required by section fourteen, a medical security contribution
for each employee computed by multiplying the wages paid each employee by
twelve per cent....
subsection (c)
An employer may deduct from the amount owed for each employee under
subsection (b) its average expenses per employee for providing health insurance
coverage or other health care benefits for its employees, allowable for the
current quarter by the Internal Revenue Service as a deductible business
expense .... such deduction for any employer shall not reduce the contribution
for any employee below zero.
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would "pay" the tax or "play" (by covering workers); and imposed no
standards on the types of benefits offered, the amount the employer must
pay, or any other plan features. Consequently, the Massachusetts law had
no direct impact on the employer-sponsored plan, but rather was directed at
the employer.
Because the HSA was repealed before it was implemented due to
political pressures within the state, the ERISA preemption issue presented
by the law was never litigated.95 The obvious preemption challenge would
have likely focused on the fact that the HSA would have forced employers
(acting as plan sponsors) to evaluate their plans and modify them to
minimize tax burdens. Whether this argument might have prevailed in the
early 1990's, it seems unlikely to succeed in the wake of the Travelers
Insurance decision. A state facing this argument could respond that the
incentive a pay-or-play law gives a plan administrator to re-evaluate
whether to pay the tax or provide coverage is no different from the
incentive New York's differential hospital surcharges gives plan
administrators to evaluate which type of insurance to buy. In the words of
the Supreme Court's Travelers Insurance opinion, the state law incentive

does not bind plan administrators to any particular choice.
Using the analysis mapped out in the Chart at the end of Part II,
argumentation on behalf of an HSA-type pay-or-play law would proceed as
follows:
(1) The HSA does not make reference to ERISA plans.96

(2) The HSA does indirectly affect ERISA plans by giving employers
an incentive to provide health care benefits to employees.
(3) The HSA does not indirectly create such acute burdens on ERISA
plans as to effectively restrain the choice of insurance providers or force
plans to adopt certain schemes of benefits. The HSA, in fact, does not
place any restrictions on the benefits provided or the insurers used.
Furthermore, the HSA is effectively a system of tax and tax credit,
allowing an employer to choose not to provide any health benefits
whatsoever and shift that burden onto the state.97
(4) The payroll tax imposed by the HSA is a law of general
applicability directed at employers and well within the states traditional

95. The Massachusetts state restaurant association challenged the HSA but dropped the
case when the law was repealed.
96. See discussion supraPart I.C.
97. See supranote 35.
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powers to tax and protect the health and welfare of its citizens.98
Consequently, a law drafted like the Massachusetts Health Security
Act should be defensible unless a court is willing to hold that the influence
of an employer tax is so considerably more onerous than the provider tax at
issue in the Travelers Insurance case that it rises to the level of an effective
"restrain[t]." Because employers would choose to pay the tax or provide
the benefits depending on which course of action would cost less, the payor-play program is likely to save money for an employer already offering
coverage, making it harder to argue that the law imposes substantial costs
on benefit plans. Of course, an employer not offering coverage would
incur higher costs due to the tax, but since it had not previously operated a
health plan, the new tax would not impose costs on a plan. 99 Conversely, if
covering workers would cost the employer less than the tax (factoring in
good will, etc.), then it could be argued that the HSA influences employers
to establish ERISA plans. However, this influence would have to rise to
the level of a substantial burden since it neither addresses ERISA plans nor
places any conditions on coverage or administration decisions.
V.

CONCLUSION

A state "pay-or-play" program designed like the Massachusetts Health
Security Act of 1988 (imposing a tax on all employers as one source of
revenue to finance a public health coverage program but crediting against
the tax the cost of any coverage provided to employees and dependents) is
most likely to survive scrutiny under courts applying Supreme Court
ERISA preemption jurisprudence. The Maryland Fair Share Health Care
Act of 2005 also seems to successfully get over the major preemption
hurdles left in play after the Travelers Insurance decision. Given the
98. General applicability has saved other state laws with an indirect effect on benefit
plans from preemption by ERISA section 514(a). For example, in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA
Medical & Clinical Service Fund, 520 U.S. 806 (1997), the Supreme Court held that New
York's Health Facility Assessment (HFA), which imposes a tax on gross receipts for patient
services at, inter alia, diagnostic and treatment centers, "is not pre-empted because it is a tax
of general application having only an incidental impact on benefit plans." Id. at 806.
99. I must concede that this point can be countered with the analysis of general state
mandates discussed in Part IV.A. What distinguishes the mandate from the choice at issue
with a pay-or-play law is that the mandate gives the employer the choice between creating a
benefit plan where there was none before or maintaining or adding to an existing benefit
plan whereas the pay-or-play model gives the employer the choice between creating or
maintaining a benefit plan and paying a tax. In the case of the former, either choice
involves benefit plans. In the case of the later, one choice, paying a tax, does not involve
benefit plans. Thus the pay-or-play law can be complied with without any effect on
employee benefit plans.
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semantic wrestling in which the Court in Travelers Insurance was willing
to engage in order to open the door for more state experimentation with
health care solutions, it seems fair to suggest that the FSHCA would not be
However, the
interpreted like a general health coverage mandate.
Massachusetts statutory scheme more efficaciously avoids any
interpretation as an employer mandate by establishing a simple system of
tax and tax deduction.
In 2002, the National Academy for State Health Policy made a series
of recommendations for pay-or-play law design features that could serve to
avoid ERISA preemption.' °° Both the Maryland Fair Share Health Care
100.
(1) Do NOT REQUIRE EMPLOYERS TO OFFER HEALTH COVERAGE TO THEIR
WORKERS. Such employer mandates would be preempted under the precedent of
the case that invalidated Hawaii's law.
(2) ESTABLISH A UNIVERSAL COVERAGE PROGRAM FUNDED IN PART WITH
EMPLOYER TAXES. The state's legislative objective should be to establish a

publicly-financed health coverage program that is funded partially with taxes on
all types of employers. Neither the law nor its sponsors should refer to
objectives such as assuring that employers cover their workers.
State laws are easily invalidated if they
refer specifically to private-sector employer-sponsored (i.e., ERISA) health
plans. The pay or play tax should be imposed on employers not on the
employer-sponsored plan and the law should not refer to such plans.
(3) DO NOT REFER TO ERISA PLANS.

(4) REMAIN NEUTRAL REGARDING WHETHER EMPLOYERS OFFER HEALTH
COVERAGE OR PAY THE TAX. If the state's objective is to assure universal

coverage, it should be neutral with respect to whether an employer pays the tax
or covers its workers. The justification for a tax credit is to permit employers to
cover workers, but the law and its sponsors should not express a preference for
either option.
(5) IMPOSE NO CONDITIONS ON EMPLOYER COVERAGE TO QUALIFY FOR THE TAX
CREDIT. Despite the state's concerns about adequacy of benefits packages, cost-

sharing, employer premium contributions, or other employer plan design
features, conditioning the tax credit on meeting certain state qualifications will
affect ERISA plan benefits and structure and therefore raise preemption
problems. Like the Massachusetts Health Security Act (designed carefully to
avoid these pitfalls), state laws impose no standards on qualification for the tax
credit stand the best chance of overcoming a preemption challenge.
(6) MINIMIZE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACTS ON ERISA PLANS. States cannot tax

ERISA plans directly; the pay or play tax must be imposed on the employer.
While the state law does provide an incentive for the employer (in its capacity
as ERISA plan administrator) to assess whether it is more preferable (from cost,
management, and employee relations perspectives) to pay the tax or cover the
workers, this burden alone should not compel ERISA preemption. Designing
the pay or play program like other state tax laws (e.g., for remitting
unemployment compensation taxes or withholding employee income taxes) can
overcome arguments that the state law interferes with interstate employer
benefits design and administration, because employers already are subject to
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Law and the Massachusetts Health Security Act comply with all six
recommendations. Since Travelers Insurance, the Supreme Court has
narrowed ERISA's preemptive reach to provide states more flexibility to
regulate health care in the glaring absence of substantive federal
regulation.'
The pay-or-play laws are the most recent non-insurance
regulation to test the scope of ERISA preemption. In fact, as of June 2005,
at least eight states have drafted legislation similar to the Maryland Fair
Share Health Care Act requiring employers to provide health care benefits
to their workers or pay the state through various means to help the
uninsured.10 2 Because no court has yet had the opportunity to consider a
state pay-or-play law, such programs, if enacted, are likely to be
challenged. However, those programs designed like the Maryland or
Massachusetts laws should survive such a challenge.

varying state tax systems.
supra note 9, at 6-8. Reprinted with the permission of
the NASHA.
101. See Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003). The Supreme
Court upheld Kentucky's Any Willing Provider (AWP) law, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
304.17A-171(2), 304.17A-270 (West 2005), requiring a health insurer to acknowledge the
services of any healthcare provider willing to abide by the insurer's plan thereby indirectly
imposing certain providers and attendant costs on employee benefit plans governed by
ERISA. Id. at 335; see also Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 372 (2002)
(upholding Illinois' "external review" law, which provides an independent appeal
mechanism for HMO enrollees to dispute benefit denials). "The Court held that ERISA did
not preempt the external review law because, among other criteria, the law applies only to
insurers and, by adding an extra layer of review for enrollee benefit disputes, regulates an
integral part of the policy relationship between HMOs and their enrollees." BUTLER, ANY
WILLING PROVIDER, supra note 50, at 4.
102. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
BUTLER, REVISITING PAY OR PLAY,

